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INTRODUCTION
In the opening of Graham Allison's book, Nuclear Terrorism, Al-
lison describes how the Central Intelligence Agency director, George
Tenet, at the Presidential Daily Intelligence Briefing on October 11,
2001, informed President Bush that he had information that Al Qaeda
had acquired a stolen Russian ten-kiloton nuclear bomb and that the
source of the information believed the weapon was in New York City.
According to Allison, in a moment of gallows humor, a staffer quipped
that the terrorists could have wrapped the bomb in one of the bales of
marijuana that are routinely smuggled into cities like New York.' The
report proved to be false - this time.2
In fact, other semi-criminal enterprises such as arms trafficking
have perfected the process of evading borders. For example, Victor
Bout, by most accounts the world's largest arms trafficker, has amassed a
vast arsenal of planes, pilots and crews and created a transportation net-
t Chair, Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College. Previ-
ous positions held: Legal Counsel to the Deputy Director of the FBI; law clerk to the Honora-
ble Leonard I. Garth (3rd Cir.); AA to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist; Supreme Court
Fellow; Dean, Roger Williams University School of Law. The views expressed in this article
are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense
University, the National War College, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
I GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM, 1-2, (2004).
2 To see the effects of a ten-kiloton nuclear bomb, see www.nuclearterror.org.
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work or "tubes" with pilots earning an average of $10,000 per shipment.3
Peter Landesman, an investigative journalist, has pointed out that arms
traffickers inherited not only the Soviet Union's cold-war weapons sup-
ply but also its fully operational systems of clandestine transport, replete
with money channels, people who understood how to use them, and,
most important, established shipping pipelines. 4 Robert Gelbard, assis-
tant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement
under President Clinton, described such networks to Landesman as "tub-
ing."'5 Gelbard noted that the "tubes" can carry different kinds of things
- "drugs, humans, money - or weapons. ' 6
The tubing process is described as follows:
Arms traffickers use what looks like legitimate business
activity to disguise the smuggling. Weapons shopping
lists are quietly passed through webs of people who fill
orders, often for cash on delivery. Usually, the first link
in the chain is military; bribes are paid to officials and
officers to look the other way, or soldiers are paid to
play warehouse stock clerks. Sometimes crates of weap-
ons are labeled perishable fruit. Or waiting aircrews
switch cargo at "refueling" stops. A pilot might fly into
an airport under one registration number and fly out
under a different one. Or he might start off on an openly
planned flight from, say, Ostend to Peru, then double
back and dogleg south to a war zone in West Africa.
Payments are wired from a buyer's shell company into a
seller's shell, often in money-laundering havens like the
Isle of Man or the Caymans or Dubai, or money is wired
to quasi-legitimate cargo companies. Sometimes weap-
ons are simply traded for bags of cash or sockfuls of
diamonds. 7
Victor Bout was a master of tubing and had ties to Central Africa,
Southern Africa, Nigeria, the Emirates, Belgium, and the Ukraine. 8 Be-
tween 1992 and 1998 approximately $32 billion of large and small-scale
Ukrainian weaponry and ammunition disappeared. 9 Customers ranged
from Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan. 10 There is no effective
3 Peter Landesman, Arms and the Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at
28.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 5.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 6.
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 5.
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"legal architecture" to regulate the arms network that operates "across
international borders in the political twilight," because each country
views arms trafficking as one of national security and therefore as a
question of national sovereignty. I I The arms trafficking business is fur-
ther complicated when governments, for geopolitical or national security
reasons, support proxy armed political movements; the result is "killers,
traffickers, smugglers and criminals" enlisted to fight a "just war.' 2 In
the words of a former U.S. government official, there is a "disposal prob-
lem" - for such a strategy, "Ask Manuel Noriega. He'd know."' 3 The
disposal problem is the unintended consequences of these clandestine
businesses and the operatives and institutional networks they create for
powers that employ the proxies.
For many U.S. strategists, this is how the War on Drugs meets the
Global War on Terrorism ("GWOT"), the fear that the smuggling routes
that have been perfected over the last three decades by drug cartels or
other quasi-criminal groups will be exploited by terrorist groups to de-
liver a nuclear, dirty, chemical, or biological bomb that will kill tens of
thousands of Americans on the homeland. 14 The drug smugglers have
demonstrated over and over again that our borders are not secure. More-
over, although not often remembered, in 1972, three Americans hijacked
Southern Airways Flight 49, circled the Oak Ridge nuclear research reac-
tor in Tennessee, threatened to crash the plane, demanded a ransom of $2
million from the airlines, and finally were imprisoned in Cuba. 15 The
threat of a combination of a terrorist act and a nuclear, biological, radio-
logical, or chemical ("NBRC") incident fuels our foreign policy and
guides our domestic homeland defense. 16 This is not to say that two
individuals with a high-powered rifle, randomly shooting innocent
Americans, cannot terrorize our local populations, but it is a matter of
scale and degree when NBRC issues are involved.17
For other strategists, the critical tie between terrorism and drugs is
money. The most recent manifestation of this tie is the support for the
1' Id. at 10.
12 Id. at 7.
13 Id.
14 See ALLISON, supra note 1, at 7.
15 Id.
16 Referred to as the "Cheney Doctrine;" When thinking about a low probability, high
impact event, Cheney is reported to have said when news reached the White House that Bin
Laden had been meeting with Pakistani scientists about the nuclear bomb that "If there's a one
percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear
weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response." See Barton Gellman, The
Shadow War, in a Surprising New Light, WASH. POST, June 20, 2006, at Cl (reviewing Ron
Suskind's THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE).
17 See Margaret Neighbour, Washington sniper sentenced to death, THE SCOTSMAN, Mar.
10, 2004, at ittp://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=584&id=276872004.
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heroin trade by the Taliban in Afghanistan.' 8 Interestingly, when the
Taliban was in power, it aimed to reduce the drug trade. Now as an
insurgency movement, the Taliban leaders have understood the benefits
of drugs as a source of income to support the struggle against the Karzi
government and its allies. 19 Drug lords are also extremely proficient at
"money laundering" and have mastered the technique of moving tens of
millions of dollars around the globe.20 Finally, narco-based gangs pursue
their own form of "narco-terrorism" or, as defined in the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency strategic plan, terrorism conducted to further the aims of
drug traffickers, including "assassination, extortion, hijackings, bomb-
ings, and kidnappings directed against judges, prosecutors, elected offi-
cials, or law enforcement agents and the general disruption of a
legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations."' 2'
All governments have found, however, that it is hard to declare war
on a tactic (terrorism), or a plant or chemical (drugs), or even a condition
(poverty), in the traditional sense of the law of armed conflict. Meta-
phors are helpful in rallying support for public policies but often can
mislead when the metaphors do not accurately fit the problem. The chal-
lenges posed by drugs and terrorism stem from social and political forces
and are more similar to protracted struggles or wars for "political order"
than to armed conflict. The foes in the GWOT oppose our foreign pol-
icy, the rise of globalism, and the principles of a liberal democratic state.
The foes in the War on Drugs provide a service and product that Ameri-
can and European citizens are demanding. Citizen who do not partici-
pate in our economy of opportunity are the objects of the War on
Poverty. These are not wars in the traditional sense - these are long-term
public policy programs requiring multi-faceted approaches by sovereign
states providing legitimate choices to their own citizens.
I. POLITICAL ORDER: A U.S. JUDICIAL CONTEXT AND THE
BROADER MODERN TRILEMMA
In any struggle to establish political order and maintain public
safety, debates will ensue over whether it is wiser to view the threat of
terrorism or even drugs as a "law enforcement" problem or a "military
18 See Ahmed Rashid, Afghanistan: On the Brink, 53 N.Y REv. OF BOOKS, June 22,
2006, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19098.
19 Though some have argued that the Taliban cut the production of heroin and then sold
the warehoused contraband at inflated prices for profit and gain. Interview by Harvey
Rishikof in Washington, D.C. (August 2006).
20 See, Tim Padgett, Banking On Cocaine, 151 TIME LATIN AMERICA, June 1, 1998,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/1998/int/980601/latinamerica.banking-on5.
html.
21 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, STRATEGIC PLAN, FY
2003-FY 2008 32. (on file with the author).
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one."'2 2 The facile answer is both. However, which paradigm ultimately
frames the approach may have far-reaching consequences for the per-
sonal autonomy citizenship issue. A state that emphasizes the military
instrument in a domestic context will increasingly have a martial empha-
sis and has a higher probability of encouraging the role of the military in
all of its critical domestic institutions. A law enforcement emphasis may
provide more restraint depending on how effectively personal autonomy
rights are respected and policed by the authorities in charge. Greater
public and personal surveillance and decreased private autonomy will
inevitably follow from either paradigm-military or law enforcement.
The fundamental questions for both paradigms are what are the checks
and balances on the government and how are citizens' personal auton-
omy rights protected? The answers to these questions will define both
the power of the state to intrude into the private sphere and the quality of
personal autonomy. What does privacy mean in the brave new world for
the United States? How has the jurisprudence for law enforcement on
the Fourth Amendment been shaped by the war on drugs? 23 One well-
known and respected federal appellate judge, former Chief Judge of the
First Circuit, Juan R. Torruella, noted over ten years ago in a celebrated
article on the War on Drugs how prosecuting the war was reforming the
basic tents of the Fourth Amendment, in particular in the search and
seizure areas.24 He lamented how for the first time courts had allowed
the issuance of search warrants in drug cases based on anonymous tips,
jeopardized the attorney-client relationship through the forfeiture of fees,
and permitted grand juries to inquire into the attorney-client relation-
ship. 25 According to Judge Torruella, to have courts approve such ap-
proaches undermined principles of legality and due process. 26
In the most recent Fourth Amendment search and seizure case in-
volving drugs (crack cocaine rocks and unlawful firearm possession) and
"the manner of entry," or the "knock-and-announce rule" for a private
home, Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme court in a 5-4 decision split
over the historic understanding of the "ancient principles in our constitu-
tional order" of what constitutes the train of events of an "entry" under a
22 In the case of drugs, the other approach is to understand the issue more as a public
heath issue than a law enforcement or military problem.
23 Amendment IV reads as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
24 Juan R. Torruella, Commentary: One Judge's Attempt at a Rational Discussion of the
So-Called War on Drugs, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1996).
25 Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted).
26 Id.
2006]
592 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:587
lawful warrant.27 The issue before the court was the appropriate remedy
- should the exclusionary rule be invoked to suppress the evidence of the
search and seizure when the knock-and-announce rule is violated?28 The
remedy to a Fourth Amendment violation is essential to the impact it will
have on a law enforcement community.
The stipulated facts of Hudson were clear. When the police arrived
to execute the warrant they waited perhaps "three to five" seconds rather
than a "20-second" pause suggested by previous precedent, or a reasona-
ble amount of time, before entering Booker T. Hudson Jr.'s unlocked
residence.29 The time delay affords the homeowner time to protect life,
property, and dignity but it should not prevent the government from seiz-
ing the evidence described in the warrant. 30
Justice Scalia's majority opinion denying the suppression remedy
focused on the legality of the warrant, particularly when the evidence
sought or taken was specifically described in the warrant. 3' In weighing
the social costs of excluding the evidence, Justice Scalia focused on the
evolution of the law in the Fourth Amendment context, intriguingly high-
lighting the "extant deterrences" that have been in place since the out-
lawing of warrantless searches under Week v. United States32 and Mapp
v. Ohio.33 The majority opinion relied on the fact that injured litigants
now have civil action remedies under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, for entry violations and that over
the past half-century there has been increased professionalism of police
forces including a new emphasis on internal police discipline.34 In short,
the remedy for the violation of the "knock-and-announce rule" in the
words of Justice Kennedy's concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment opinion was "not sufficiently related to the later discovery of the
evidence to justify suppression. '35
Justice Breyer, in an ironic dissent, traced the lineage of the "knock-
and-announce rule" back to the 13th century citing Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U.S. 927 (1995), as the key precedent where the Court held the rule
was a "basic principle" that "was woven quickly into the fabric of early
American law" 36 and that the Framers thought the "method of an of-
27 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
28 Id. at 2163.
29 Id. at 2162.
30 Id. at 2165.
31 Id.
32 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
33 367 U.S. 643 (1971).
34 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
35 See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170. Justice Kennedy refused to join the majority on its
interpretation of other warrantless searches in Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796 (1984) and New
York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
36 514 U.S. 927, 932-33 (1995).
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ficer's entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in
assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure."' 37 For Justice
Breyer, the precedents are clear, and suppression of the evidence is
required:
We have held that a court must "conside[r]" whether of-
ficers complied with the knock-and announce require-
ment "in assessing the reasonableness of a search or
seizure." Wilson, see Banks. The Fourth Amendment in-
sists that an unreasonable search or seizure is, constitu-
tionally speaking, an illegal search or seizure. And ever
since Weeks (in respect to federal prosecutions) and
Mapp (in respect to state prosecutions), "the use of evi-
dence secured through an illegal search and seizure" is
"barred" in criminal trials. (full citations omitted)
For another thing, the driving legal purpose underlying
the exclusionary rule, namely, the deterrence of unlawful
government behavior, argues strongly for suppression.
See Elkins v. United States (purpose of the exclusionary
rule is "to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty.., by removing the incentive to disregard it").
In Weeks, Silverthorne, and Mapp, the Court based its
holdings requiring suppression of unlawfully obtained
evidence upon the recognition that admission of that evi-
dence would seriously undermine the Fourth Amend-
ment's promise. All three cases recognized that failure to
apply the exclusionary rule would make that promise a
hollow one, see Mapp, supra, at 657, reducing it to "a
form of words," Silverthorne, supra, at 392, "of no
value" to those whom it seeks to protect, Weeks, supra,
at 393. Indeed, this Court in Mapp held that the exclu-
sionary rule applies to the States in large part due to its
belief that alternative state mechanisms for enforcing the
Fourth Amendment's guarantees had proved "worthless
and futile."'38
As the divided court makes clear there are two paths emerging over
the power, extent, and breadth of the Fourth Amendment and how the
courts will enforce the process by which law enforcement execute war-
rants. Exclusion of evidence has always been a remedy that forces law
enforcement to follow rules - it is yet to be tested how training and civil
suits affect law enforcement behavior patterns.
37 Id. at 934.
38 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
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But the issue is larger than just how the Fourth Amendment is inter-
preted to police the police. How U.S. Congress and the courts balance
the challenges of privacy, national security, and the war on drugs, tech-
nology and the Fourth Amendment will define our concept of citizen-
ship. This challenge is not solely an "American" challenge but
ultimately a world challenge. The Club of Rome, a global think tank, has
identified the critical global issues confronting the planet: environment,
demography, development, values, governance, work in the future, the
information society, new technologies, education, the new global society,
and the world economic and financial order. 39 Technology and security
have become intertwined issues. Some have characterized the new inter-
connected world situation as a "world problematique. 40
In the same vein, in 2003 the World Summit on the Information
Society ("WSIS"), a meeting endorsed by the United Nations General
Assembly, published its "Declaration of Principles--Building the Infor-
mation Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium,"stressing a
common vision for the access to information and knowledge. 41 The
WSIS is calling for a "model of cooperation" for the Internet whereby
control would become internationalized and nationalized. China, for ex-
ample, monitors and censors web communications that use such terms as
"liberty" or "Falun Gong."' 42 The world has recognized the trilemma of
balancing technology, security, and privacy, and there is a struggle tak-
ing place over who will control the "electronic superhighway - the pri-
vate sector, governments or international institutions." In the European
Union the principles of data protection and state responsibilities are en-
shrined in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 for the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data."'43 In May 2006, for example, the European Court of Justice upheld
39 See The Club of Rome, Global Issues, http://www.clubofrome.org/about/global-is-
sues.php (last visited Dec 1, 2006).
40 See William J. Drake Collective Learning in the World Summit on the Information
Society 8 (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Working Paper Series No. 2,
2005), available at http://www.cpsr.org/pubs/workingpapers/2/Drakepdf; see also The Club of
Rome, World Problematique, http://www.clubofrome.org/about/world-problematique.php
(last visited Dec 1, 2006) .
41 G.A. Res. 56/183, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/183 (Dec. 21, 2001); Int'l Telecomm. Union
[ITU], World Summit on the Information Society Declaration of Principles, Building the Infor-
mation Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium, at 6, Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVAI
DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/officia/dop.html.
42 Mark A. Shiffrin and Avi Silberschatz, Op-Ed., Web of the Free, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2005, § 4, at At 3.
43 See The European Commission, Freedom, Security and Justice, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/justice..home/fsj/privacy/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). For a statement of the state princi-
ples see Directive 95/46/EC particularly Ch. II Sec. I Art 6 at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/
eudirective/EUDirective_.html#HDNM6.
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a challenge by the European Parliament to an agreement between the
U.S. and the European Commission and European Council providing for
the transfer of extensive personal data on European air passengers to the
authorities in the United States.44 In 2004, the agreement gave American
counterterrorism authorities access to thirty-four different types of infor-
mation including names, passport details, credit card numbers, addresses
and phone numbers of approximately 9.6 million passengers on all
flights that originate from the twenty-five European Union member
states.45 The European Court gave the Commission a four-month grace
period to negotiate a new treaty with the United States. More compara-
tive work should be done to see how different states and emerging states
are approaching the trilemma - information technology, security, and
personal autonomy.
Europe has taken an aggressive approach to data protection, the key
to personal autonomy. Yet, at the same time Great Britain, in its fight
against Irish terrorism, created one of the most watched "public spaces"
in western society as demonstrated by its investigation against the recent
radical Islamic bombings.46 For example, as catalogued by Jeffrey Ro-
sen, Britain has helped lead the way in public camera surveillance. He
noted in 2001 that "in 1994, 79 city centers had surveillance networks;
by 1998, 440 city centers were wired. By the late 1990's, as part of its
Clinton center-left campaign to be tough on crime, Tony Blair's New
Labor government decided to support the cameras with vengeance. There
are now so many cameras attached to so many different surveillance sys-
tems in the U.K. that people have stopped counting. According to one
estimate, there are 2.5 million surveillance cameras in Britain, and in fact
there may be far more."'47 Today in London there are "at least 500,000
cameras in the city and one study showed that in a single day a person
could expect to be filmed 300 times."'48 The U.S. is beginning to take the
same approach and install cameras in major cities at critical sites. As
many have pointed out, eventually, with the right algorithm and imaging,
the authorities will be able to pick you out of the data mine of stored
images and your life patterns will be clear.
44 See Nicola Clark, European Court Bars Passing Passenger Data to U.S, INT'L HER-
ALD TRIB., May 31, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2OO6/O5/30/news/
fly.php.
45 Id.
46 Steve Stecklow, Jason Singer & Aaron 0. Patrick, Watch on the Thames: Surveillance
Cameras Monitor Much of Daily Life in London, May Help to Identify Bombers, WALL ST. J.,
July 8, 2005, at B 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article-print/SB 11207734064788
0052-cKyZgAbOT3asU4UDFVNPWrOAqCY20060708.html.
47 Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchfid State N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
48 Stecklow, Singer & Patrick, supra note 46, at B1.
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In contrast to much of the world, on these issues of technology and
privacy, Congress has traditionally taken an approach informed by our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Judicial oversight has been the
"American Way," as stipulated by Title III in the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act ("Title III"), the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), and the hotly debated Communica-
tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA").
According to the Title III record, since 1968 judges have authorized
approximately 31,000 wiretaps, 10,750 by federal judges and 20,225 by
state judges. Between 2001-2004 there were 6,001 Title III electronic
surveillances, or in other words, 1/5 of the total number of wiretaps have
taken place over these last four years.49 The theory has been that inde-
pendent judges should be required to review the offer of proof by law
enforcement for probable cause before wiretaps, surveillance, and access
to one's home can be violated. This is part of the check and balance
scheme so heralded in our constitutional system. The system assumes
life-tenured, unelected federal judges to be the most impartial gate keep-
ers as opposed to elected, for-term, state judges.
With the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001, controversy swirled
around the sunset clauses: § 203 - the authority to share criminal investi-
gative information; § 206 - the roving surveillance authority under the
Foreign Surveillance Act; §§ 209, 212, 220 - access to wire and elec-
tronic communications; § 214, 215 - the pen register and trap and trace
authority under FISA and access to business records under FISA ("Li-
braries Provision"); § 218 - the lowering of the "wall" that allegedly
separated law enforcement and intelligence operations for certification
requirements from "the purpose" to "a significant purpose"; and finally
the issuance of "national security letters" under the sole discretion of the
Attorney General.50 More recently "warrantless wiretaps" for national
security reasons have sparked intense public debate.51 The fear was that
the traditional Fourth Amendment protections of probable cause were
being eroded as more and more information, without appropriate judicial
review, was being accessed, viewed, processed, and controlled by gov-
ernment authorities. Critics wailed that Congress had broken the sacred
bond of Fourth Amendment protection with any new legislation as the
49 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Title III Electronic Surveillance 1968-
2005, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/wiretap~stats.html.
50 The best description of the debates is contained in AM. BAR Ass'N STANDING COMM.
ON LAW AND NAT'L SEC., PATRIOT DEBATES: EXPERTS DEBATE THE USA PATRIOT ACT (Stew-
art A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005).
51 See Larry Abramson, Q&A: The NSA's Domestic Eavesdropping Program, NPR, May
17, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=5187738 (last visited Feb. 10,
2007).
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traditional distinction between "citizen" and "non-citizen" was being
undermined. 52
Defenders argued that the new threats, the new technologies, and
the new demands for security required us to stop tying our hands behind
our backs and create new powers of cooperation among law enforce-
ments, intelligence agencies, and foreign allies.53 The technology of-
fered a new opportunity to "connect the dots" in the name of national
security. 54 The historic distinction between domestic and foreign was
being eroded by technologies, markets, and collective actions such as the
internet; therefore, a new paradigm of national defense was needed.
Traditional distinctions in the law between "citizens" and "non-citizens,"
although valid, required recalibration.
As more and more personal data was being stored by third parties,
like Internet Service Providers ("ISP"s), given the reduced expectation of
privacy for data held by third parties, would a warrant be required? For
some, the answer had to be "tech-savvy courts":
This isn't a technology problem; it's a legal problem.
The courts need to recognize that in the information age,
virtual privacy and physical privacy don't have the same
boundaries. We should be able to control our own data,
regardless of where it is stored. We should be able to
make decisions about the security and privacy of that
data and have legal recourse should companies fail to
honor those decisions. And just as the Supreme Court
eventually ruled that tapping a telephone was a Fourth
Amendment search, requiring a warrant-even though it
occurred at the phone company switching office-the
Supreme Court must recognize that reading e-mail at an
ISP is no different.55
But will the courts understand technology and data storage with this
Fourth Amendment view? Much of the information is controlled by pri-
vate parties - banks, insurance companies, credit card businesses, tele-
phone companies, and internet providers. In short, what is private and
what is public? How does one establish the boundary? What is the ap-
propriate "reasonable expectation of privacy" in this new world of elec-
52 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2002); see also David Cole,
Their Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO 290
(2003).
53 See John Yoo, THE POWER OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (University of Chicago Press, 2005).
54 See Shane Harris, Group Proposes System to "Connect the Dots" about Terrorist
Attacks, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/l104/111804hl.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2007)
55 See Bruce Schneier, Digital Information Rights Need Tech-Savvy Courts http://
www.schneier.com/essay-080.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
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tronic connectivity and potential threat of catastrophic damage? In a
world where unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVS") can circle the battle-
field and project force, should UAVS be deployed domestically for law
enforcement purposes? 56 Is any open space private anymore?
What constitutes appropriate intrusion without a warrant for investi-
gative purposes? Historically the Supreme Court has been the critical
institution that has defined the US expectation of privacy. A recent case
that joined this issue of public domain and private protection was Kyllo
v. United States.57 The United States Department of the Interior sus-
pected that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home, which was
part of a triplex.5 8 Given that indoor marijuana growth typically requires
high-intensity lamps, federal agents used an Agema Thermovision 210
thermal imager to scan the triplex. 59 Thermal imagers detect infrared
radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the
naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on relative
warmth - black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative
differences; in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera
showing heat images. 60
Interestingly, the district court found that the Agema 210 "is a non-
intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual
image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house"; it "did
not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure"; "[t]he
device used cannot penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or
human activities"; and "[n]o intimate details of the home were ob-
served." 61 The district court upheld both the validity of the warrant and
its denial of the motion to suppress.62 On appeal, the court held that
Kyllo had not shown a subjective expectation of privacy because he did
not attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he
had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because
the imager, "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only
"amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall. '63
The 5-4 Supreme Court decision, written by Justice Scalia and
joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Ginsburg, reasoned that
the eye unaided by technology (although previously airplane viewings
56 See Peter Bowes, High Hopes for Drone in L.A. Skies, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/5051142.stm (last visited June 6, 2006).
57 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 30.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 31.
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were held to be legal under California v. Ciraolo,64) was constitutional,
but when "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use,
to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknow-
able without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a "search" and is pre-
sumptively unreasonable without a warrant. '65 For many defenders of
the Fourth Amendment the tying of the decision to "general public use"
undermined the basic principle of the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Do our protections turn on the issue of general availability
and common use?
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by the Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy, turned on a con-
stitutional distinction between "through-the-wall surveillance" where the
observer or listener has direct access to information in a private area, and
the thought processes used to draw inferences from information in the
public space. 66
For the dissenters, the majority's rule deals with direct observations
of the inside of the home. However the case involved observations of the
exterior of the home. According to the dissenters, "the supposedly
"bright-line" rule the Court has created in response to its concerns about
future technological developments is unnecessary, unwise, and inconsis-
tent with the Fourth Amendment.' 67
What is appropriately in the public domain and what is private? In
Illinois v. Caballes, the Court further reduced the concept of private
space. 68 Justice Stevens, who authored the dissent in Kyllo wrote the
opinion in Caballes, a 6-2 decision (one Justice was recused) upholding
the sentence of a driver who had been stopped for speeding and was
found to have illegal drugs in his possession.69 While being detained for
speeding, a dog sniffed the vehicle and the police found $250,000 worth
of marijuana in the truck.70 Caballes claimed that using a "canine sniff'
in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity violated his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search.7 1
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower trial court, stating
that "specific and articulable facts" are necessary to justify the use of a
drug-sniffing dog.72 For the United States Supreme Court majority, how-
64 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
65 Kyllo 533 U.S. at 40.
66 Id. at 41.
67 Id. at 41.
68 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
69 Id. at 406-407.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 People v. Caballes, 802 N. E. 2d 202, 205 (2003).
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ever, "[a] dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop
that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 73 The ten-minute stop was held to be reasonable. For the dis-
senters, Justices Ginsburg and Souter, the precedent meant random,
suspicionless, drug-sniffing dog sweeps of unoccupied vehicles in park-
ing lots or garages and on curbsides would almost certainly be com-
pletely permissible under the Fourth Amendment.74
For some, after Caballes the concept of privacy in automobiles was
almost completely gone; it took only about seventy-five years. Will fu-
ture Supreme Courts see electronic data, technology, and information
more as part of the home and requiring warrants, or will the expectation
of privacy erode as more technology becomes part of the general public
use? Are electronic search engines, spiders, and "smart algorithms" re-
ally just electronic dogs doing data mining under the Fourth
Amendment?
From the history of the Fourth Amendment and warrants, one sees a
trend that is not overly comforting. The courts, when confronted with
threats that may strike at the very core of society, have not always rein-
forced the Fourth Amendment. Congress has often aided and abetted
during these periods and become captured by the sweep of emotions. In
the early part of the 20th century, the "Red Threat" and the Palmer Raids
created such national fear that the courts restricted speech and punished
dissenters. During the period of prohibition and the introduction of cars
as modes of transportation, the Supreme Court crafted the right to search
in "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment.
During World War II, the Japanese internment camps undermined
the Fourth Amendment and the concept of "individualized" guilt. Subse-
quent generations have viewed these internments as "self-inflicted
wounds" but placed within the context of the times. 75 In the "Red Scare"
of the 1950's, Congress under Senator McCarthy violated individual
rights, and the courts by and large either stayed on the sidelines or were
involved in enforcing death penalties, such as in the case of the
Rosenbergs. 76 During the "War on Drugs," and Kyllo notwithstanding,
our concept of expectation of privacy has diminished significantly. Now
the GWOT has placed new pressure on governmental authorities to
73 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
74 Id. at 411.
75 William H. Rehnquist, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE, Chapter 15: World War II: Japanese
Internment (Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
76 See Harvey Rishikof, Rosenberg v. United States (1953), in THE PUBLIC DEBATE
OVER CONTROVERSIAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, (Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., 2006); Ethel &
Julius Rosenberg, Atomic Espionage, in 100 AMERICANS MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2004).
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gather information to prevent attacks with potentially catastrophic
dimensions - nuclear, biological, radiological, and chemical.
The prevention of such catastrophic events turns on timely and ac-
tionable information. Technology increasingly is giving us access to un-
precedented information about each individual, as they become part of
the global economy. It is becoming harder and harder to hide if you
interact with the electronic cash nexus - credit cards, smart cards for car
travel, and etc. The Department of Defense ("DoD") proposed a total
inform access program to tap these electronic data.77 The Information
Awareness Office of the Total Information Awareness program stated its
mission was to "imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and
transition information technologies, components and prototype, closed-
loop, information systems that will counter asymmetric threats by
achieving total information awareness useful for preemption; national se-
curity warning; and national security decision making. '78 The fear of
"big brother" without judicial restraint, however, caused the program to
be scuttled.
Technology may also change how we discover the "truth." Brain
pattern monitoring in the future may unlock the key to veracity. "Brain-
fingerprinting of neuro-imaging," given the right algorithms, is part of
the promise of functional magnetic resonance imaging ("f.M.R.I.") and
truth telling.79 Although this technique may be appropriate for foreign
prisoners of war, under the current Geneva Conventions such techniques
would be illegal. 80 Currently, such use of technology would be barred in
the U.S. because U.S. citizens are under the Fifth Amendment's protec-
tions against self-incrimination. Though the Supreme Court has allowed
the taking of blood and DNA samples from defendants, it may have to
determine in the future if such an imaging technique can be employed,
just like a DNA or blood test. Needless to say Congress, to this point,
has not been conspicuous by its silence on these topics.
For many the solution to this trilemma - information technology,
security, and privacy - has been checks and counter-balances. How do
we police this phenomenon? Do we continue to rely on Federal judges'
determination of warrants' legality, or hire more inspector generals and
empower them with greater authority? How about creating a civilian
77 See Gene Healy, Beware of Total Information Awareness, CATO INSTrTUTE (Jan. 20,
2003), http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-20-03.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
78 See "Total Information Awareness Resource Center," http:// www.geocities.coml
totalinformationawareness/ (last visited December 1, 2006).
79 See Harvey Rishikof & Michael Schrage, Technology vs. Torture, Psychopharmaceuti-
cals and Brain Imaging Could Make Prisoner Interrogation More humane. Should we use
them?, SLATE, Aug. 18, 2004, http://slate.msn.comlid/2105332.
80 See Geneva Convention III at http://www.yale.edulawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva
03.htm.
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advisory civil rights boards or requiring a tougher congressional over-
sight of the process? Are these measures enough?
The executive branch, composed of honest and patriotic citizens
charged to defend the Republic, will be increasingly using these new
technologies to "connect the dots" before incidents take place to prevent
a disaster. The intelligence agencies have been reorganized into a new
structure under the Director of National Intelligence. Only time will tell
whether this latest reorganization will prove to be effective.
In this brave new world, what is our legitimate "expectation of pri-
vacy" when the key to protection is information? The Congress and
courts are the shaper of the trilemma and the balancer to the executive
branch, but will there be a Patriot Act II in the wake of another incident?
How will the boundaries be drawn to contain the genie? Will the world
community agree with our new rules?
Ironically, the more we grant court-approved and congressionally-
authorized electronic access for security reasons, the more the demand
will be for better encryption programs. The better the encryption pro-
grams to thwart the "smart sniffers," the greater the need will be for
physical entry either at message's origin or message's final destination.
The cycle will continue. So what is the answer to the trilemma?
In the end, there is no easy answer. Indeed the "genie is out of the
bottle." Technology is creating new challenges for privacy and Congress
must begin to address the issue in an open manner. More informed pub-
lic debate and discussion of the risks and consequences of eroding the
distinction between citizens and non-citizens, as viewed by the law, is
required. Courts will address the issue in the time honored common law
"case-by-case" manner, but the national security imperative will be a
powerful weight on the scales of justice. If history is to be a predictor,
without congressional guidance, the courts alone may not prove to be
enough.
II. ARE THERE ANY PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE
WAR ON DRUGS?
In a recent essay on the Lessons of the "War" on Drugs for the
"War" on Terrorism, a group of social science researchers, Jonathan P.
Caulkins, Mark A. R. Kleiman, and Peter Reuter, suggested six catego-
ries to compare the two "wars": 1) crime control and investigation within
the United States; 2) the use of prison to incapacitate offenders; 3) con-
trol efforts outside the United States and at the border; 4) financial inves-
tigation and control; 5) overall coordination of enforcement efforts; and
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6) rhetoric, media, and communications issues.81 But the authors wisely
cautioned that the two "wars" differed in fundamental ways: the scale of
the activity to be suppressed; the structure of the organizations whose
schemes one must try to foil; the motivations of their participants; the
scale, structure, and direction of the related financial transactions; and
the tolerance for failure.82 The authors further reasoned that "even if, as
some argue, "the war on drugs has been a failure," that would not imply
the inevitable failure of the attempt to suppress terrorist actions. Nor
would they recommend that we can simply adopt wholesale for
counterterrorism successful strategies and tactics from the anti-drug ef-
fort."' 83 In short, the lessons identified in the drug wars, to quote the
British, require nuance and subtlety.
In the area of crime control, for the terrorist struggle, there are no
"consumers" as in the drug sense of those who create a demand for con-
trolled substances. In drugs, as in terrorism, there has been little benefit
in "hardening targets" - e.g., redesigning streets or reinforcing cock-
pits.84 Perpetrators have demonstrated that they can and will adapt to
attempts to block the problem. Both counter strategies support "under-
cover operations" and both activities defend against penetration by using
blood and clan ties as required prerequisites to the inner circles.85 Drug
distribution networks, however, are atomistic, not monolithic, with multi-
ple paths from network to customer and can be in competition with each
other.86 This competition can be and has been exploited by law
enforcement.
Terrorist groups in this sense are not in competition for the same
market. For some, terrorist networks are more vertically and horizontally
integrated in the manner of organized crime, like the La Cosa Nostra
("LCN"). 87 To fight LCN, the Justice Department under Robert F. Ken-
nedy created the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in the Crim-
inal Division to work with city-based "strike forces." '88 New legislation
was pursued to give more weapons to the prosecution such as the Racket-
eer Influence and Corrupt Organization statute ("RICO"). The goal was
81 Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A. R. Kleiman & Peter Reuter, Lessons of the "War" on
Drugs for the "War" on Terrorism, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2002-05 John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, June 2002, available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.
edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/Lessons ofjthe War onDrugsforjthe War on Terrorism.
pdf.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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to create a capacity for a long struggle against the crime families.89 In
this period, the focus of the target was primarily domestic.
The new terrorist and drug cartels are more international in nature
than historic crime families. Slowly, the government has reorganized
itself and passed new legislation to fight radical Islamic groups with in-
ternational connections. Part of the underside of globalization has been
the "globalization" of crime and networks. Organizing the state for this
brave new world had historically been incomplete and controversial.
Do the traditional crime justice system philosophies - deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incarceration - work for terrorism? Have they worked
against the drug cartels? In the world of drugs, personnel replacement,
even with long-term incarceration, has been easy. 90 Part of the GWOT is
to focus on "high value targets" that represent the key planning cells and
spiritual leaders of the movement. These individuals are considered the
"A" team who pose the biggest threat to the homeland. 9' These individ-
uals, in the analysis of Bruce Hoffmann, the noted terrorist analyst, un-
derstand the requirements for a successful terrorist operation and can put
together the six key requirements: 1) knowledge of how to create dam-
age, or ingenuity in developing new methods of doing so; 2) access to the
requisite material means; 3) a supply of operatives willing to kill and
perhaps to die; 4) the ability to raise money and move it around interna-
tionally; 5) an organization capable of putting these requisites together to
carry out operations across borders; and 6) motivation, either intrinsic or
extrinsic. 92 In this "decapitation" thesis, taking out these "leaders" will
go a far way in protecting the homeland. In the drug world, in contrast,
studies estimate that a million Americans sell cocaine in a 12-month pe-
riod.93 The logic is that there are fewer highly skilled key personnel in
terrorism than drugs, so replacement will be more difficult.
International control of "non-government organizations" with or
without alleged state support outside of the United States has proven to
be a thorny issue. Illegal activity on such a grand scale requires some
degree of support or tolerance by a local government to be successful
according to many in the arena of drugs and terrorism. How to respond
to this inability to control a geographical area has become the challenge
of the 21st century in the wake of the cold war. Example of this is when
Panama was invaded 1989, and General Noreiga was removed and tried
under drug charges in federal court. In Colombia, the U.S. government
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See Re-thinking Terrorism in Light of a War on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Terrorism and Homeland Sec., 107th Cong. 8-9 (2001) (statement of Dr. Bruce
Hoffman, Vice President, External Affairs and Director, RAND Washington Office).
93 Caulkins, Kleiman & Reuter, supra note 81, at 8.
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has been supporting a long-term policy to aid the Colombian government
in exercising control over the drug cartels with Plan Colombia. 94
The area of interdiction is perhaps the best way to demonstrate a
significant difference between the two "wars." As pointed out by social
scientists, stopping 90 percent of the drugs entering the United States
would be a spectacular success, but letting through even 10 percent of
terrorists or materials for major terrorist acts could be a disaster.95 What
is in the end a tolerable degree of failure in the drug war is intolerable in
the war on terrorism, if the homeland is involved.
In the arena of finance, a comparison of the magnitude of numbers
involved in the two wars is best reflected in the fact that the estimated
cost of financing the attack of 9/11 was approximately $500,000, roughly
nine minutes of revenue in the U.S. cocaine market.96 Since 9/11, inves-
tigating money laundering and tracking illegal flows of money have in-
creasingly risen to the top of the policy agenda.97 The problem is that
terrorist networks have retained the ability to transfer funds undetected
particularly when the cost of some of the attacks are comparatively so
cheap. The Hawala networks or the informal money transfer systems 98
still exist, and in the current high terrorist locations - Iraq and Afghani-
stan - improvised explosive devices are in strong supply cheaply. Given
the low cost of terrorism - an individual willing to wear a bomb vest -
stopping an attack by choking the financial resources appears a weak
approach.
As noted by Caulkins, Kleiman, and Reuter the public policy les-
sons identified from the war on drugs are mixed.99 In essence, the drug
wars have limited lessons for the war on terrorism and the history of
fighting drugs is a sobering story. The enforcement problem for the two
wars or campaigns is very different. There are no "customers" for ter-
rorists as in drugs, and the leadership for international terrorism may
prove to be as interchangeable as drug cartel leaders. How deterrence
and incapacitation will work against terrorism remains an open question.
Border interdiction has proven to be a failure in the drug context and it is
unclear how the government will be more successful against a deter-
94 See Bill Weinberg, Washington Votes for War in Colombia, THE NATION, posted Oct.
19, 2004, at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20041 101/weinberg.
95 Id. at 10.
96 Id. at 12.
97 See Testimony of Stuart A. Levey, Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelli-
gence U.S. Department of the Treasury BEFORE THE HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITrEE,
September 22, 2004 at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/jsI940.htm.
98 See Leonides Buencamino & Sergei Gorbunov, Informal Money Transfer Systems:
Opportunities and Challenges for Development Finance, U.N. Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Aff.
Discussion Paper Series (Nov. 2002), U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/2002/DP/26, available at http://
www.un.org/esa/desalpapers/2002/esaO2dp26.pdf.
99 Caulkins, Kleiman & Reuter, supra note 81, at 8.
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mined terrorist. 1°° The money needs for a terrorist are comparatively
small. The ability to exploit the money laundering networks for terrorist
acts has been demonstrated by the successful attacks in Spain and En-
gland. Perhaps the most sobering lesson of the war on drugs concerns
the organization of government institutions.
III. IS THE INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION REORGANIZATION? -
DHS? DNI? MI5?
For many commentators the critical answer for both "wars" is cen-
tered on creating the right governmental organizational structure so that
effective coordination can be achieved. 10 1 First, from the vantage point
of personal autonomy, it is critical to note that the U.S. has, and contin-
ues to treat the drug issue as a criminal matter as opposed to a public
health issue as have a number of European states.'0 2 The whole "legali-
zation" of drugs movement, although growing due to the efforts of many
participants of this conference, still has not carried the day. As pointed
out by researchers, the drug war domestically involves "more than a
score of federal agencies, as well as uncounted state and local agencies.
At the federal level alone, there are significant efforts by the Bureau of
Prisons, the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI"), the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the De-
fense Department, the Education Department, the Department of Veter-
ans Affairs, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration; each of these nine agencies each spends more than a
billion dollars a year on anti-drug efforts."' 0 3
To coordinate the war, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
("ONDCP") was created in 1989 with an announced mission of giving
coherence to U.S. anti-drug efforts. ONDCP has a number of resources:
"a director with cabinet status has the central role in promulgating an
official National Drug Control Strategy, and statutory authority to "cer-
tify" agency budgets as adequate to the needs of that strategy, as well as
to propose mid-year reallocations of resources within and across agen-
cies, and management of a performance indicator system."1' 4 In effect, a
drug czar was placed in charge.
100 See generally Stephen E. Flynn, Beyond Border Control, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec.
2000 (for an explanation of the troubles in policing the border).
101 See President Bush's remarks at signing into law the Intelligence Reform and Terror-
ism Prevention Act at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/l 2/print/20041217-
1 .html.
102 See Van Solinge & Tim Boekhout, Dutch Drug Policy in a European Context, Journal
of Drug Issues, Summer 1999 available at http://findarticles.comlp/arti.cles/mi-qa37331is 199
907/ain8851692.
103 Caulkins, Kleiman & Reuter, supra note 81, at 14.
104 Id. at 16.
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In addition to the creation of the ONDCP or a drug czar, a dedicated
federal agency was given a single mission to fight the war: the DEA.
Prior to 9/11 there was no analogous enforcement or intelligence organi-
zation dedicated to counterterrorist operations. The DEA's budget was
$1.7 billion for fiscal year 2003; it has a staff of 9,200, half of whom are
special agents (i.e., criminal investigators with arrest powers), and it has
experienced recent growth. 0 5 Nevertheless, it represents only 18 percent
of all federal domestic counterdrug enforcement efforts.' 0 6
Sadly, even with these organizational changes, the researchers la-
ment that "predictably" there have been coordination problems between
the DEA and other law enforcement agencies; the ONDCP has not been
able to exercise true control over the federal drug budget; the creation of
a national policy has been hampered by individual agency "veto" power;
and congressional "balkanization" of budgets by different appropriations
committees has hampered coherence. 10 7
The only light is that "the single-purpose character of the DEA
means, among other things, that drug enforcement will not be entirely
neglected when some other problem dominates public attention. The
constancy of DEA's attention to the drug problem contrasts with the
rapid cutback in the Customs Service's counterdrug efforts as it shifted
efforts to the counterterrorism mission after September 11. ''l08
In the GWOT, a similar story emerges on the domestic front. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation in post-war America was the lead agency
in the war against terrorism. After 1946 two critical documents shaped
the FBI's mission and roles in the area of national security and
counterterrorism: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")
(1978) and Executive Order 12333 (1981). In the wake of 9/11, Con-
gress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terror'0 9 ("USA
Patriot Act"), fundamentally changing the "12333/FISA" world. This le-
gal regime separated criminal and intelligence matters to protect the po-
litical autonomy of US citizens. But the FBI remained the lead agency in
the domestic fight against terrorism. No separate domestic agency dedi-
cated to combating terrorism, such as M15 in England, was created.
The organizational and programmatic solutions to criticisms of the
government's performance pre 9/11 have been radical, beginning with
the creation of the Department Homeland Security and the transfer of
105 Id.
106 Id. at 17.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terror, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001).
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former FBI functions such as the National Infrastructure Protections
Center (computer security) to the new Department of Homeland Secur-
ity. In addition, the Bush Administration took action on 37 of 39 of the
9/11 Commission's recommendations that apply to the Executive Branch
making 13 key institutional changes:
1) Appointing the Director of National Intelligence.
President Bush signed into law the landmark Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, which overhauls the intelligence community,
mandating a range of reforms and centralizing in
one office key authorities. The Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) serves as President Bush's prin-
cipal intelligence advisor and the leader of the Intel-
ligence Community. The first DNI, Ambassador
John Negroponte, was confirmed by the Senate and
sworn in this past April.
2) Establishing the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC). The NCTC assists in analyzing
and integrating foreign and domestic intelligence
acquired from all U.S. government departments and
agencies pertaining to the war on terrorism. The
Center identifies, coordinates, and prioritizes the
counterterrorism intelligence requirements of
America's intelligence agencies and develops stra-
tegic operational plans for implementation. In July
2005, the Senate confirmed the President's nomi-
nee, Vice Admiral Scott Redd, to become the first
Director of the NCTC.
3) Establishing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Of-
fice (DNDO). The DNDO, in the Department of
Homeland Security, provides a single federal organ-
ization to develop and deploy a nuclear-detection
system to thwart the importation of illegal nuclear
or radiological materials.
4) Appointing a Privacy and Civil Liberties Over-
sight Board. The President has nominated the
Chairman and Vice Chairman and appointed the
other three members to serve on the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board, to further help en-
sure that privacy and civil rights are not eroded as
we fight the War on Terror.
5) Establishing the Terrorist Screening Center. In
order to consolidate terrorist watch lists and provide
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around-the-clock operational support for Federal
and other government law-enforcement personnel
across the country and around the world, the Ad-
ministration created the Terrorist Screening Center.
The Center ensures that government investigators,
screeners, and agents are working with the same
unified, comprehensive set of information about
terrorists.
6) Transforming the FBI to Focus on Preventing
Terrorism. The President has led the effort to
transform the FBI into an agency focused on
preventing terrorist attacks through intelligence col-
lection and other key efforts, while improving its
ability to perform its traditional role as a world-class
law-enforcement agency. (e.g. "The service within
the service" combining the counterterrorism and
counterintelligence divisions into one branch.)
7) Strengthening Transportation Security Through
Screening and Prevention. Since 9/11 the Trans-
portation Security Administration (TSA) has made
significant advancements in aviation security, in-
cluding the installation of hardened cockpit doors, a
substantial increase in the number of Federal Air
Marshals, the training and authorization of
thousands of pilots to carry firearms in the cockpit,
the 100 percent screening of all passengers and bag-
gage, and the stationing of explosives-detection ca-
nine teams at each of the Nation's largest. These
initiatives have raised the bar in aviation security
and shifted the threat.
8) Improving Border Screening and Security
Through the US-VISIT Entry-Exit System. US-
VISIT uses cutting-edge biometric technology to
help ensure that our borders remain open to legiti-
mate travelers but closed to terrorists. US-VISIT is
in place at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 50 land
border crossings across the country. Since January
2004, more than 39 million visitors have been
checked through US-VISIT.
9) Establishing the National Targeting Center
(NTC) to Screen All Imported Cargo. DHS es-
tablished the NTC to examine cargo and passengers
destined for the United States to identify those
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presenting the greatest threat. The NTC screens data
on 100 percent of inbound shipping containers (9
million per year) to identify those posing a "high
risk." CBP personnel examine 100 percent of high-
risk containers.
10) Expanding Shipping Security Through the
Container Security Initiative (CSI). The CSI is
currently established in over 35 major international
seaports to pre-screen shipping containers for illicit
or dangerous materials before they are loaded on
vessels bound for the United States.
11) Developing Project Bioshield to Increase
Preparedness For a Chemical, Biological, Radio-
logical, Or Nuclear Attack. Project BioShield is a
comprehensive effort that will ensure that resources
($5.6 billion) are available to pay for "next-genera-
tion" medical countermeasures, expedite the con-
duct of NIH research and development on medical
countermeasures based on the most promising re-
cent scientific discoveries, and give FDA the ability
to make promising treatments quickly available in
emergency situations. Project BioShield will help
protect Americans against a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attack.
12) Cracking Down on Terrorist Financing With
Our International Partners. Over 400 individuals
and entities have been designated pursuant to Exec-
utive Order 13224, resulting in nearly $150 million
in frozen assets and millions more blocked in transit
or seized at borders. We have built an international
coalition that is applying more rigorous financial
standards and controls to help prevent terrorists' use
of the international financial system. Specifically,
we have established with the Government of Saudi
Arabia a Joint Task Force on Terrorism Finance that
serves as a coordinating mechanism to cooperate on
important terrorism-financing investigations.
13) Increasing Cooperation and Reform Among In-
ternational Partners At The Front Lines Of The
War On Terror. In Pakistan over the next five
years, we will provide more than $3 billion in secur-
ity, economic, and development assistance to en-
hance counterterrorism capacity and promote
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continued reform, including of the education sys-
tem. In the last three years, the United States pro-
vided more than $4.5 billion in reconstruction,
economic, and security assistance programs to
Afghanistan. 110
In the wake of 9/11 the U.S. has reorganized, but the ultimate ques-
tion still remains: will this reorganization improve coordination among
the sixteen intelligence agencies involved in the GWOT? In the event of
another 9/11 event will more reorganization be called for?
IV. SHOULD AMERICA HAVE AN MI5?
The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has a Department
for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, the Coast Guard
and intelligence units. DHS, as is to be expected of a fledging federal
institution defining itself in the more robust and institutionalized intelli-
gence community, has had a slow start due to senior-level resignations,
lack of analysts, and insufficient resources. 11' The decision to keep the
FBI and CIA as separate institutions with DHS as a "client" for informa-
tion guaranteed that the new organization would have to struggle to es-
tablish an intelligence role. As DHS battles for identity and function,
there will be continuing bureaucratic tussles over whether the depart-
ment's primary focus is on acting as a "B" team that reexamines all the
intelligence assembled by the FBI and the CIA, as a point agency for
tightening security on "main street," or as primary liaison to the private
sector in the critical infrastructure sectors outlined by the Marsh Com-
mission on security. 1 2
In Britain, MI5 acts as a domestic analytical and spy agency. Being
debated as an alternative solution is an "American" MI5, or an agency
dedicated to protect the U.S. from terrorism and espionage. 1 3 This
would entail restructuring the FBI, DHS, and Treasury and hiving off the
110 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Progress On The
9/11 Commission Recommendations and Key Institutional Developments and Accomplish-
ments (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051205-5.html.
As highlighted by the White House, these 13 changes reflect the key institutional reorganiza-
tion accomplishments of the executive branch.
I 1 John Mintz, Infighting Cited at Homeland Security, Squabbles Blamed for Reducing
Effectiveness, WASH. POST, February 2, 2005 at A01 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/
wp-dyn/A55552-2005Feb 1 ?language=printer.
112 See John Mintz, At Homeland Security, Doubts Arise Over Intelligence; United is
Underpowered, Outmatched in Bureaucratic Struggles With Other Agencies, Critics Say,
WASH. POST, July 21, 2003, at A12; President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion, 1997; ("General Marsh Commission").
113 See Fayza Elmostehi & Michael D. Vozzo, Domestic Intelligence and National Secur-
ity Reform Proposals, http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/Past%20Events/Papers/ISHS/
ElmostehiVazzo.pdf.
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national security, counterterrorism and counterintelligence functions to
combine all of the relevant analysts into one agency, as is currently the
practice in Great Britain. In Britain, MI5 is under the Office of the
Home Secretary and its agents have no arrest authority. 1 4 The service is
empowered with expansive investigative powers for domestic surveil-
lance, intercepting all communications, eavesdropping, using informants
and moles." 5 Under this scenario, the FBI would function more like
Scotland Yard and concentrate on traditional national crimes and organ-
ized crime violations. Presumably the new entity would also work
closely with DoD assets to act as a clearinghouse for all of the relevant
information from the thirteen major intelligence-gathering agencies."16
Needless to say, the resistance to the creation of MI5 comes not only
from a philosophical resistance to the notion of a "domestic spy agency"
with expanded powers, but also from all the existing intelligence bureau-
cracies who oppose the concept of losing such assets. 117 The creation of
DHS without significant intelligence powers reflects this dual resistance
to an American MI5. Even with such an agency the issues of sharing
information, analyzing information, and having constitutional and Con-
gressional accountability still remain.
Given these constraints, a group of experienced former government
officials suggested an interim MI5 approach that might be more bureau-
cratically acceptable to the intelligence community.' 1" 8 Arguing for more
information domestically on terrorist cells and the need for the integra-
tion of counterintelligence with counterterrorism that goes beyond a
"case-file mentality," the group called for the creation of a new and ac-
countable agency within the FBI.' 19 Using the National Security Agency
and the National Reconnaissance Office as models, it is envisioned that
the new agency embedded within the FBI would have as its director a
presidential appointee not from law-enforcement, be responsible to the
directors of the DNI and CIA, be governed by Attorney General Guide-
lines, have its own independent personnel system for hiring, and have
114 Nigel West, MI5 as a Model for an American Secuirty Agency, JOURNAL OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY, Aug. 2006, available at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjoumal/Com-
mentary/displayCommentary2.asp?commentary=33.
115 Don Van Natta Jr., Threats and Responses: Antiterrorism, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2003,
at A8; see also M15's Homepage, http://www.mi5.gov.uk (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
116 Senator John Edwards, Homeland Security Address at the Brookings Institute (Dec.
18, 2002).
117 Todd Masse, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5
Model to the United States, CRS- RL31920, May 19, 2003 at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/
RL31920.pdf.
118 America Needs More Spies - Intelligence and security, THE ECONOMIST, July 12,
2003, at 44 (The group of former officials includes from the FBI, Robert Bryant and Howard
Shapiro; from the DoD, John Hamre; from DEA, John Lawn; and, from the CIA, John Mac-
Gaffin, and Jeffrey Smith).
119 Id.
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direct oversight by the FISA court and Congress.' 20 This approach was
also recommended in 2005 by the Commission on the Intelligence Capa-
bilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Robb-Silberman Commission) who suggested that the FBI needed a
separate National Security Service within the FBI that included the Bu-
reau's Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Divisions, as well as the
Directorate of Intelligence. 12 1 The FBI responded and created the Na-
tional Security Branch ("NSB") combining intelligence and counterter-
rorism. For some critics this was not enough.' 22
The Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act ("Intelli-
gence Reform Act"), 123 passed in December 2004, mandated the largest
reorganization of the US intelligence community since the 1947 National
Security Act and created a new Director of National Intelligence
("DNI"), instilled with expanded and overarching budgetary, acquisition,
tasking, and personnel authorities to more effectively integrate the 15
members of the US Intelligence Community into a unified, cohesive, and
coordinated enterprise. 124 The Intelligence Reform Act also created a
National Counterterrorism Center ("NCTC") to serve as a true fusion
center to collect, analyze, and disseminate all source information and in-
telligence - domestic and foreign - related to terrorism and
counterterrorism.
Prior to the Intelligence Reform Act, the U.S. Intelligence Commu-
nity was coordinated by a Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI"), with
little statutory or budgetary authority over the community. The DCI also
acted as the Director of the CIA and the President's principle advisor on
all intelligence matters. To summarily state it, no DCI was ever able to
successfully accomplish the task of coordinating the intelligence commu-
nity. The coordination of the community was all but insurmountable,
given the DCI's limited powers, and the enormous job of running the
sprawling worldwide bureaucracy - the CIA.
Unlike a DCI, the DNI has no corresponding burden to manage an
intelligence agency like the CIA. DNI only has to provide true overarch-
ing coordination and oversight among the intelligence community and to
act as the President's principle intelligence advisor. In the year since his
120 Id.
121 See THE COMM'N ON THE IN, TELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES RE-
GARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REP. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
451-52 (2005), available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd-report.pdf.
122 See MICHAEL D'ARCY, MICHAEL O'HANLON, PETER ORSZAG, JEREMY SHAPIRO &
JAMES STEINBERG, PROTECTING THE HOMELAND 2006/2007 (2006).
123 The Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 08-458, Dec.
17, 2004 at http://www.nctc.gov/docs/plI08_458.pdf.
124 Scott Jesse, The Current Complexion of U.S. Counterterrorism 43 (May 1, 2006) (un-
published paper, on file with author).
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appointment as the first DNI in April of 2005, Ambassador John Negro-
ponte has begun the effort to reshape and integrate the US Intelligence
Community. He recently stated:
Our strategy focuses on protecting the nation today,
making the nation safer tomorrow and building a
stronger Intelligence Community right now. It requires
aligning Intelligence Community members with these
objectives so that we optimize the Community's total
performance as opposed to optimizing its members' in-
dividual operations. We are in the process of remaking a
loose confederation into a unified enterprise. This will
take time-certainly more than a year-but with the
right approach, it can be done. 125
As one can readily deduce from this solution, one of the continuing
questions is: Who is in charge of integrating domestic law enforcement
intelligence from the approximately 650,000 police officers, domestic
federal agencies, and foreign national intelligence? Although the DNI is
the titular head of the intelligence community, the director does not con-
trol approximately 80% of the intelligence budget, which is under the
authority of the Secretary of Defense, and as a matter of law, the DNI
director cannot operate domestically without severe legal constraints. 126
However, the DNI has coordination and budget authority over the FBI's
new intelligence branch, the NSB. 127 Terrorist organizations that cut
across domestic and foreign jurisdictions have created both legal and in-
stitutional problems. To resolve this dilemma, some have hoped that the
new DNI is the answer for all intelligence issues. 128
No less a critic of the recent institutional reforms than Richard A.
Posner, the respected appellate judge of the 7th Circuit, has called for a
domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI with no law enforce-
ment responsibilities - a MI5 or a DST - the French Direction de la
Surveillance du Territoire. 129 Skeptical of the "service within a service"
or NSB solution, Posner cites the classic criticisms of the FBI: the notori-
ous computer failures; a chaotic and changing organizational structure
125 See John D. Negroponte, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Address Before the Nat'l Press
Club: Intelligence Reform: Making It Happen, (Apr. 20, 2006).
126 See Chapter 10, Intelligence at Home: The FBI, Justice, and Homeland Security in the
report of The Commisssion on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, ("The WMD Commission"), March 31, 2005 at http://
www.wmd.gov/reportl.
127 D'ARCY, O'HANLON, ORSZAG, SHAPIRO & STEINBERG, supra note 122, at 32.
128 WILLIAM E. ODOM, FIXING INTELLIGENCE: FOR A MORE SECURE AMERICA (lst ed.
2003).
129 RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE
THROES OF REFORM 88 (2006).
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(five alone since 1998); a retrospective criminal mindset of punishment
not prevention; its geographical decentralization, the personnel depart-
ment's resistance to support intelligence for career advancement; the turf
conscious in-fighting against the CIA and now DNI; the lack of training
for intelligence analysts; the specific problems of the Virtual Case File
project; the fractured reporting structure of the head of the NSB to the
FBI director, deputy director, Attorney General, and DNI; the split loyal-
ties of the FBI director to criminal and intelligence matters; the advan-
tage of a fresh start over reform within; and, finally the need to reform
the "culture' of the law enforcement mind-set.' 30
Recognizing the counter arguments that FBI-NSB should be given a
chance to succeed, Posner is adamant that the FBI's "heavy hand" and
culture will not change from within. '31 He deplores the forty-six days on
average the FBI needs for an application to the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court and is disparaging of the role the FBI has played in the
Joint (federal-state-local) Terrorism Task Forces. Posner believes that
specialization in international terrorism, as opposed to having jurisdic-
tion for domestic attacks by the Animal Liberation Front, will provide
the needed focus. 132 In an ironic twist, Posner rejects the argument that
keeping the FBI as the dominant domestic intelligence service will pro-
tect our civil liberties the best. 133 The FBI, due to the discipline of col-
lecting and keeping evidence for criminal matters, has institutionalized
our Fourth Amendment protections, and cannot treat material for intelli-
gence purposes alone. This results in more risk for the homeland. The
trilemma, however, continues whether we have an independent domestic
intelligence service or not. How do we square the triangle?
CONCLUSION: SOVEREIGNTY AND CHOICE
The "long wars of political order" are not just for emerging democ-
racies. Sovereignty lies at the heart of what constitutes a political re-
gime, and a political regime is defined by how it protects its citizen's
autonomy and choices. To Mois~s Naim, however, "sovereignty is one
of the thorniest issues of our times."' 134 Conspicuously absent from the
list of key institutional reorganization accomplishments are the changes
taking place in the U.S. military and its new role in the struggle against
terrorism and drugs. In the War on Drugs, the U.S. military plays an
increasingly important role abroad as reflected in its participation in
130 See id. at 87-109.
131 Id. at 111.
132 Id. at 114.
133 Id. at 116-17.
134 MoIsts NAfM, ILLICIT: How SMUGGLERS, TRAMCKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HI-
JACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 274 (2006).
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"Plan Colombia." In 2000 the U.S. military began to train Colombia
counternarcotics units, and subsequently the military in counterin-
surgency against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
("FARC"), the National Liberation Army ("ELN"), and the United Self-
Defense Forces of Columbia ("AUC").135 All three organizations alleg-
edly fund their activities through drug revenues and are designated by the
U.S. State Department as foreign terrorist organizations. 36 The narco-
terrorist fusion has haunted Colombian politics for decades, and the civil
war that is being waged is a test case for political order in the region.
Counterinsurgency and counterintelligence continue to be the keys for
the elected Colombian government. In the most recent election in May
2006, President Alvaro Uribe, for the first time in more than a century,
was reelected as an incumbent president.137 The previous president to do
so was President Rafel Nunex in 1892. To protect the election process,
approximately 220,000 troops guarded polling stations and other sensi-
tive areas. As part of President Uribe's "democratic security" agenda, he
increased the number of troops and police on the streets by 25% and
doubled military spending by obtaining financial backing from the
U.S.' 38 Under Plan Columbia, Uribe secured almost $4 billion from the
United States. 139 Since 2002 about 30,000 of the paramilitary group
AUC have returned weapons under an amnesty agreement. 140 Moreover,
approximately fifty-five politically motivated killings and kidnappings
were recorded for the period of May 2005 to May 2006 - an 81% reduc-
tion from the prior elections in 2002, when the FARC kidnapped the
candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who still remains captive.' 41 During this
political process, Colombia remains the world's largest producer of co-
caine. While the rest of South America tilts left in Bolivia, Venezuela,
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile - Columbia has voted for political
order and a continued fight against cocaine. It remains a bloody and
deadly unstable combination.
The War on Drugs is a choice that our legislature has made to re-
strain the private options of our citizens. Not all states and citizens have
made the same choices. To some we have entered a period of "nanny-
state paradigms" whereby the state plays the role of the parent prohibit-
135 ANDREW FEICKERT, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM:
AFGHANISTAN, AFRICA, THE PHILIPPINES AND COLOMBIA 16-17 (2005), available at http://
www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32758.pdf.
136 Id. at 17.
137 Colombians Keep Uribe in Power in Landslide: U.S. Ally Has Led Fight vs. Rebels,
WASH. POST, May 29, 2006, at A17.
138 id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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ing bad products. 142 In "The Devil's Picnic," Taras Grescoe traveled the
world, trying food, drugs, and drinks that are illegal and prohibited by
one state or another. For example he sampled 'Absinthe Suisse' in Swit-
zerland, coca leaves in the Andes, criadillas (bulls' testicles) in Madrid,
hjemmebrent, (a type of local moonshine) in Norway, Epoisses, (a
cheese made from raw milk, not pasteurized and banned in the United
States for health reasons) in France, a $65 dollar Cohiba Esplendido Cu-
ban cigar (banned in the United States for political reasons) in Montreal,
poppy seed crackers in Singapore, and finally investigated a state as-
sisted suicide club for non-citizens in Switzerland dollars that use over-
doses of pentobarbital sodium for approximately $2-3,000 as the
preferred method of demise. Grescoe notes that in the Andes people
have been chewing coca as far back as 2500 B.C.; such use is deep in the
Andes' culture. Ironically, to Grescoe banning or prohibiting commodi-
ties that people crave has historically resulted in three consequences:
what is forbidden becomes more potent, and due to nonregulation, more
deadly; it artificially inflates prices and creates fortunes for criminal ac-
tors that can bankroll internecine wars; and, it creates self-perpetuating
institutions or enforcement agencies that exist to remove that which it
has an interest in maintaining. 43
The regime of personal prohibition can be stifling. In the words of
C.S. Lewis, "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good
of all its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live
under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies."
' 144
Moreover, for Lewis:
Theocracy is the worst of all governments. If we must
have a tyrant, a robber baron is far better than an inquisi-
tor. The baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupid-
ity at some point be sated; and since he dimly knows he
is going wrong he may possibly repent. But the inquisi-
tor who mistakes his own cruelty and lust of power and
fear for the voice of Heaven will torment us infinitely
because he torments us with the approval of his own
conscience and his better impulses appear to him as
temptations. "45
142 TARAS GRESCOE, THE DEVIL'S PICNIC: AROUND THE WORLD IN PURSUIT OF FORBID-
DEN FRUIT 51 (2005).
143 Id. at 352.
144 C.S. LEWIS, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment (1949) reprinted in GOD IN THE
DocK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS (Walter Hooper, ed.) (1970).
145 C.S. LEWIS, OF OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS AND STORIES 81 (Walter Hooper, ed.)
(1966).
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The intrusive state that controls with a moral certitude is the antithe-
sis of the liberal state based on personal autonomy. In the attempt to
control the private "harm", the public "cure" becomes a private toxin. So
what is to be done with the "twin wars" that are connected at times and
yet fueled by different private motives and public political goals? For
Naim the problem, or paradox, is one of "Black Holes v. Bright
Spots."'1 46 As sovereignty erodes and it becomes harder to control bor-
ders, Black Holes, the ungoverned spaces, become breeding grounds for
all forms of illicit commodities and provide succor for international ter-
rorism. The Bright Spots of prosperity cannot build impenetrable fortifi-
cations since being connected to the world of commodities, goods, and
people are the keys to brightness. The darker the Black Hole, the more
desperate are the people to be tied to the Bright Spots and sell goods,
minds, work, illicit materials and even their bodies to traffickers. The
two trends create ever-widening price differentials for all things and,
therefore, an even greater incentive to connect the two worlds - hence
the paradox. As pointed out by Nam, illicit trade is driven by high prof-
its not low morals; it is a political phenomenon supported by corruption;
it is intertwined with licit trade; and governments cannot solve the prob-
lem alone. Nalim proposes enhanced, developed, and deployed technol-
ogy as an answer - radio frequency identification devices; chemical and
biological product tags; biometrics; detection and security devices; sur-
veillance and eavesdropping; data mining and software; more global
positioning satellites; and, finally biotechnology for an anti-cocaine
vaccine. 147
In a world of asymmetric power, terrorists will not follow the rules
of the nation states or the laws of armed conflict. In the end, only politi-
cal solutions will end major terrorists' acts. A political order with inter-
national penetrating and expansive technology for counterintelligence
purposes will come at the expense of privacy, personal autonomy, and
sovereignty as borders and transportation become increasingly transpar-
ent. This new political order will be very different from the classic 19th
century liberal state, which for the last 200 years has been the ideal
model of personal autonomy. The modem trilemma, and how it is finally
resolved will dictate the relation of information technology, security, and
private autonomy. But the wars may still go on, nonetheless.
146 NAIM, supra note 134, at 263-65.
147 Id. at 239-47.
